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gold standard club in any of its varieties, either before or after 1914. Unlike 
the vast majority of the European currencies, the peseta’s exchange rate 
fluctuated, sometimes widely, against gold and gold currencies. Gold 
convertibility was suspended in 1883 and never resumed. Nevertheless, the 
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standard, was an outlier in the international economy and made plans to put 
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FLOATING AGAINST THE TIDE: SPANISH MONETARY 
POLICY, 1870-1931 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The gold standard is not the monolithic metallic monetary system that it was 
once believed to be. Country cases and detailed studies of the actual workings of the 
system have shown that the gold standard was not a rigid mechanism for adjustment to 
external disequilibria, and that it enabled core and peripheral nations to tailor it to their 
needs. Exchange rate stability was achieved by various means. Some countries followed 
the so-called ‘rules of the game’, while others systematically evaded the rules and 
resorted to a variety of methods to keep the price of their currencies fixed against gold. 
Moreover, gold coins were a major part of the money in circulation in some countries, 
while gold did not circulate at all in others. Gold convertibility was usual in the core 
countries but, to a certain extent, specie convertibility was the exception in peripheral 
nations. As has recently been stressed, a re-conceptualisation of the gold standard 
system has brought to the fore its reputational aspects and its status as a “contingent 
rule”, instead of the traditional approach, which focused on adherence to strict patterns 
of behaviour and well-defined rules. According to the new approach, the monetary 
policies that were followed in the short term mattered little, provided that in the long 
term a country was fully committed to the regime and that the financial community 
believed this to be true1. We also know now that countries’ monetary authorities’ 
commitment to a fixed exchange rate regime (in the form of target zones) did not lead to 
them entirely relinquishing their monetary independence, as long as agents considered 
the countries’ commitment to be credible. In consequence, as long as economic agents 
considered a country’s commitment to gold as credible, the country could violate the 
rules of the game in the short term to further other policy goals. Moreover, evidence 
shows that the objectives of central banks under the gold standard regime was not 
simply convertibility and the stability of the exchange rate but, rather, a combination of 
goals, including profit maximization, just as with any other private financial institution2. 
The gold standard began to emerge as a universal monetary system in the late 
1870s, and it had spread throughout the world economy by 19003. It was unusual for 
nations to be off the gold standard, and it meant that they were detached from the 
international financial community. World War I led to the complete breakdown of the 
gold standard. Exchange controls were introduced almost universally, with the sole 
exception of the United States, international flows of capital were interrupted, and world 
trade collapsed. The Armistice of November 1918 did not lead to the immediate 
restoration of the gold standard. The war was followed by a serious and protracted 
economic and financial crisis, and all the European currencies experienced wild 
fluctuations, which were particularly acute in the nations of the former Axis powers. 
Although currency stabilisations began in 1923-24 under the auspices of the League of 
Nations, the reintroduction of the gold standard was marked by the British pound 
sterling’s return to gold at its pre-war parity in 1925. By the end of 1929, when the New 
                                               
1 The challenge to the traditional view of the gold standard began with Triffin (1964). More recently  
Flanders (1993), Bordo and Kidland (1995), Bordo and Rockoff (1996), and an excellent state of the art 
in Morys (2011) 
2 Recent country studies that reexamine the monetary policy of the central banks, Contamin (2003), 
Ögren (2007), Reis (2007) and Jobst (2009). 
3 Eichengreen and Flandreau (1996); Gallarotti (1995) 
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York Stock Exchange crash ushered in the Great Depression, most European currencies 
were once again linked to gold4. 
 Spain never joined the gold standard club in any of its versions, either before or 
after 1914. Unlike the vast majority of the European currencies, the peseta’s exchange 
rate fluctuated, sometimes widely, against gold and gold currencies5. Gold convertibility 
was suspended in 1883 and never resumed. Nevertheless, the monetary authorities were 
aware that the Spanish economy, off the gold standard, was an outlier in the 
international economy and made plans to put the peseta on gold both before and after 
1914. No matter how forcefully they were pursued, all attempts ultimately failed 
because policy measures were not always consistent with this goal. Neither the Treasury 
nor the Bank of Spain was prepared to take the necessary measures to choose an 
appropriate par and to make the commitment to maintaining it. The Ministry of Finance 
was unable to balance the budget and to follow an orthodox fiscal policy along the lines 
required to keep the exchange rate stable. Meanwhile, the minutes of the board of 
directors of the Bank of Spain show that its private interests, i.e. paying high dividends 
to its shareholders, always prevailed over the public interest (a stable peseta). One 
conclusion of this paper is precisely that: the adoption of the gold standard was a mere 
‘wish’ but, ultimately, the actual monetary and fiscal policies were not oriented towards 
that goal, or at least they were not pursued with sufficient conviction. 
 The monetary experience of Spain, which was until very recently a poor and 
peripheral country, may be of interest for several reasons. First, it is the only European 
country in which the gold standard was never implemented, despite the fact that the 
monetary authorities repeatedly declared their intention to peg the peseta’s exchange 
rate to gold. Why Spain never adopted the gold standard is a complex issue, and our 
paper offers a possible answer by examining the behaviour of an issuing bank that 
refused to accept, or resisted, its role as a central bank. Our study also provides a basis 
for a comparison between the Bank of Spain, some of its features and policies, with 
other peripheral issuing institutions. Moreover, our paper encompasses both the pre-war 
and the post-war periods, which allows us to present both the similarities and the 
differences in the exchange and monetary policies of the Spanish authorities during the 
era of the classical gold standard and the years of the gold exchange standard. 
 We have chosen to focus our analysis on the policy and behaviour of the Bank of 
Spain which enjoyed the monopoly of issue for the entire country from 1874 onwards6. 
In the following section, we provide a brief outline of the main constraints and 
determining factors in the Bank’s policies. Section three is devoted to examining the 
Bank’s behaviour during the classical gold standard period. A similar analysis for the 
interwar period is conducted in section four. The paper concludes with a final section, 
which is both brief and speculative. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 For the interwar period, an excellent summary in Drummond (1987) 
5 The Spanish monetary experience has been studied by Martín-Aceña (1993 and 2000a); the gold 
standard issue has also been dealt with by Sardá (1948), Tortella (1994), and more recently in papers by 
Serrano Sanz, Gadea and Sabaté (1998), Cubel (2001), Llona (2001), Serrano Sanz (2004), García-
Iglesias (2005) and Ródenas and Bru (2006). For the long term evolution of the peseta exchange rate, 
Sabaté (1993) and Aixalá Pastó (1999).  
6 Three recent papers with the history of the Bank of Spain for the period 1874-1962, Tedde (2006), 
Tortella (2006), and  Martín-Aceña (2006).  
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2. Capital mobility, fiscal deficits and the balance of payments 
 Members of the gold standard club are supposed to behave appropriately in 
order to maintain the stability of the exchange rate, and the convertibility of its currency 
into gold. They must allow capital to move freely, i.e. they cannot raise barriers to the 
exportation and importation of gold; and they must avoid persistent imbalances in the 
country’s government budget and in the current account balance of payments. 
 Capital mobility was the rule before 1914. Foreign investment flowed 
unimpaired into the country. Likewise, foreign investors could repatriate interests and 
dividends as often as they wished and without any obstacles. Gold inflows and outflows 
were not controlled or subject to any type of official intervention7. Railways, banks and 
industrial firms could borrow freely on the international markets, and the government 
floated bonds in the London and Paris stock exchanges, provided that guarantees of 
repayment were given. One of the key features of the workings of the gold standard was 
thus in place. The experience with capital mobility during the interwar years was more 
complex. Mild and partial exchange controls were introduced as early as 1919 to 
contain the depreciation of the peseta. The systematic administrative intervention on the 
exchange market began in 1928 and intensified during the following years, and Spain 
was one of the first countries to introduce a formal exchange control apparatus8. Capital 
mobility was not then a feature of the period, but was also not part of the international 
economy. However, this did not prevent many countries from adhering to the so-called 
gold exchange standard. 
 With the exception of one year, the Spanish budget closed with significant 
deficits between 1874 and 1898, which were particularly large at the end of the century 
due to the extraordinary expenditure required by the colonial wars in Cuba, Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines. The outstanding public debt tripled as a consequence, and part of it 
found its way into the portfolio of the Bank of Spain, contributing to the increase in the 
amount of high-powered money. The monetisation of the debt thus led to an increase in 
the quantity of money in circulation slightly over GDP, which made Spanish prices 
diverge from the relentless decline in international prices. After 1900, fiscal reform and 
a drastic conversion of the debt turned the government accounts around, and the budget 
ended with surpluses for nine years in a row. Thereafter, the deficit made a return and 
new debt issues were necessary. The Treasury went to the Bank and to the market but 
eventually most of the securities were monetised. Had the Bank of Spain attempted to 
follow an independent monetary policy during those years, it would have come into 
conflict with the Treasury and its financial needs. The budget deficit persisted during 
the 1920s and 1930s, although the Ministry of Finance introduced reforms to increase 
revenues and measures to curtail spending. These were insufficient to balance the 
annual budgets9. It can therefore be argued that public finance, i.e. the government’s 
inability or unwillingness to eliminate the deficit, may have been one of the 
impediments to adopting the gold standard. Exchange rate stability was certainly an 
official goal, but actual fiscal policy was inconsistent with such a goal. Nevertheless, 
the reverse argument is also plausible and has to be explored. Adherence to the gold 
standard required fiscal discipline, at least in the long term. If the Spanish monetary 
authorities had committed to the gold standard, they would have been forced to 
rationalise spending and above all to reform and modernise the fiscal structure. 
                                               
7 Sardá (1948) and Broder (1976) 
8 Eguidazu (1978); Martínez-Ruiz (2000) 
9 The relationship between the Treasury and the Bank of Spain in, Anes and Tedde (1976), and Martín-
Aceña (1985). The link between monetary policy and fiscal policy in, Sabaté Sort, Gadea and Escario 
(2006) 
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Moreover, a well-behaved Treasury would have been in a better position to impose its 
will (exchange rate stability) upon a Bank of Spain with a franchise as sole issuer that 
depended on the government. Faced with the alternative of losing its privilege or 
contributing to the maintenance of the gold standard and the gold convertibility of the 
peseta, it is probable that the Bank would have preferred the latter, and its 
transformation into a genuine central bank would have occurred earlier. 
 External imbalance is another possible reason for Spain’s unusual monetary 
experience10. Until the mid-1880s, the persistent current account deficits in the balance 
of payments were amply covered by capital inflows that were channelled into railways 
and banking companies, as well as into government bonds. The stream of foreign 
investment ended in the 1880s and the current account ran a surplus until 1898. The 
trade deficit returned thereafter, but so did foreign capital. The current account closed 
with increasingly large surpluses from 1905 onwards. As Spain was a neutral country, 
the war years fostered exports and limited imports, and the balance of payments ended 
with large surpluses as a result. However, during the interwar period the external 
balance was reversed. In the 1920s, the trade deficits were huge, and the balance of 
payments was also negative in the 1930s, despite the adoption of strict exchange 
controls. 
 The balance of payments results over these six decades do not lend themselves 
to an easy interpretation as regards the question of the gold standard and its long-term 
sustainability. Our view is that, contrary to some arguments, the balance of payments 
was not a constraint on the choice of monetary regime, if only because when deficits 
occurred they amounted to a relatively small percentage of GDP. Furthermore, a 
credible commitment to the gold standard would have certainly improved access to the 
global capital market and reduced transaction costs with other gold standard nations. 
Periods of balance of payments difficulties would have mattered less or not at all 
because the current account deficits would have been settled with capital inflows. In 
fact, given the historical experience during the pre-war era, when funds from London, 
Paris and Berlin financed world trade and covered current account imbalances, there is 
no reason to suppose that Spain would have not received as much capital as it needed to 
compensate any deficit, whether external or internal. The interwar era admittedly poses 
more problems but the argument is still valid, since we know that peripheral countries 
on the gold standard in Europe and elsewhere were able to obtain capital in New York 
until at least 1929. 
 
3. The monetary policy of the Bank of Spain during the Classical Gold Standard, 
1874-1913 
Spain never adopted the gold standard. The country retained a bimetallic 
monetary system until 1883, at which point the peseta’s gold convertibility was 
suspended and the exchange rate shifted to a floating regime within an international 
context of the gold standard11. Figure 3.1 shows the rate of the peseta against the pound 
sterling and the French franc, which were considered benchmark currencies at the time. 
The developments in this respect fall into three periods. During the first period, until the 
early 1890s, Spain maintained the price of the peseta within a narrow range by 
controlling the monetary aggregates. In the second period, from the early 1890s 
onwards, when the peseta depreciated considerably due to an excess of issue, there was 
an exchange rate crisis in 1898 due to the excessive monetisation of the public deficit 
                                               
10 Spain´s international trade and balance of payments position in Tena Junguito (1992) and Prados de la 
Escosura (2011) 
11 Sardá (1948), pp. 183-184 
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due to the financing of the colonial wars. In the third period, after the loss of the last 
colonies, the peseta appreciated because economic policymakers strove to correct the 
increase in the money supply caused by the excessive budget deficit. 
 
Figure 3.1: Nominal exchange rate, 1874-1913 
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
18
74
18
76
18
78
18
80
18
82
18
84
18
86
18
88
18
90
18
92
18
94
18
96
18
98
19
00
19
02
19
04
19
06
19
08
19
10
19
12
Pe
se
ta
s/
St
er
lin
g 
po
un
d
Pe
se
ta
s/
Fr
en
ch
 fr
an
c
Pesetas/French franc Pesetas/Sterling pound
 
Source: Martín-Aceña and Pons (2005), p. 704 
 
Despite being off the gold standard system, Spain always maintained a political 
interest in joining the gold standard monetary system.12 In this section, we examine the 
monetary policy adopted by the Bank of Spain during the era of the classical gold 
standard. Our objective is to analyse whether the Bank of Spain’s monetary policy was 
oriented towards the objective of joining the gold standard, or if its policy was based on 
goals other than the gold standard.  
The traditional literature defined the monetary policy that central banks had to 
follow to sustain the gold standard as ‘the rules of the game’. These rules forced central 
banks to implement a restrictive monetary policy when the country was losing gold and 
an expansionary monetary policy when the country was accumulating gold in order to 
restore equilibrium in the balance of payments13. Compliance with the rules of the game 
was measured by two indicators. The first indicator was based on the relationship 
between the change in reserves (non-earning international assets) and the change in 
domestic income-generating assets. If the country began to lose gold, the central bank 
had to sell bonds from its portfolio for cash, reducing the money supply and therefore 
restricting the outflow of gold. Both the reserves and the domestic income-generating 
assets were reduced as a result, and a positive correlation between the changes in two 
variables showed that the central bank was following the rules of the game. The second 
indicator was based on the relationship between the change in the interest rate and the 
change in the reserve ratio (reserves divided by sight liabilities, notes plus deposits). 
                                               
12 Junta Consultiva de la Moneda, 1876-1880. Record books: vol. 22859.  
13 Nurkse (1944), Bloomfield (1959) 
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The central bank had to raise the interest rate to reduce the money supply when it was 
losing reserves, and lower the interest rate to increase the money supply when it was 
gaining reserves. A negative correlation between the rates of change in the interest rate 
and the reserve ratio therefore shows that the central bank was following the rules of the 
game. 
Spain did not follow the rules of the game in the classical gold standard era of 
1880-191414. The annual variation in the Bank of Spain’s domestic income-generating 
assets and reserves presents a negative correlation for more than 40% of this period. In 
addition, there was no systematic negative correlation between changes in the interest 
rate and the reserve ratio. The Bank of Spain’s interest rate underwent a few changes 
throughout the entire classical gold standard period, and there was only a negative 
correlation between changes in the interest rate and the reserve ratio in the early 1880s 
(1879-1884) and in the late 1890s (1896-1903), when the reserve ratio fell significantly, 
which threatened convertibility and in fact led the Bank of Spain to cease converting its 
notes into gold in 1883. 
However, these results are not surprising. Bloomfield (1959) tested the rules of 
the game followed by the countries belonging to the gold standard monetary system and 
found that central banks did not follow the rules of the game but enjoyed uninterrupted 
convertibility.15 The reason for this is that central banks did not implement monetary 
policy based on the balance of payments as required by the rules of the game, but 
instead used the rule of convertibility as a de facto monetary target, i.e. a fixed exchange 
rate sustained by interventionist policies in the market16. The classical gold standard 
was an exchange rate band, in which exchange rate movements were limited by the gold 
points17. The central banks guaranteed convertibility by applying exchange rate policies 
to maintain exchange rates within the gold band. The most common policy of 
intervention followed by central banks was the sale of gold against their own notes in 
the domestic bullion market, which enabled them to stabilise the exchange rate and 
enjoy discretion in monetary policy at the same time. Interest rates did not react to the 
loss of reserves when the exchange rate was strong, only doing so when the exchange 
rate was weak and convertibility threatened. 
Some peripheral countries such as Portugal, which had a small domestic bullion 
market, applied exchange policies based on importing gold and exchange rate 
manipulation to maintain the changes within the gold band18. Others, such as Sweden, 
adopted passive policies to defend convertibility. The central banks in the gold standard 
system were required to convert their notes on demand into metallic coins on demand - 
gold coins in the gold standard system. The convertibility of notes into gold stabilised 
the exchange rate because if the exchange rate went beyond the gold points, the 
arbitration process would readjust the exchange rate as long as the Bank had enough 
reserves to change its notes until the exchange rate was restored. This passive defence 
of convertibility required a high reserve ratio, which ranged from 50% to 100% in the 
case of Sweden. The Riksbank strangled domestic credit, keeping interest rates high to 
protect the specie standard19. The monetary policy applied by the Bank of Spain after 
                                               
14 Martín-Aceña (1993) 
15 See also White (1933) for France, Drummond (1976) for Russia, Dutton (1984) for England, Jonung 
(1984) for Sweden, McGouldrick (1984) for Germany and Reis (2007) for Portugal. For a review and 
summary see Michaely (1968), Drummond (1987) and Ford (1962). 
16 Bordo and MacDonal (1997), Bordo and MacDonal (2005), Flandreau and Komlos (2006), Jobst (2009,  
and Flandreau (2008). 
17 Eichengreen and Flandreau (1997) 
18 Reis (2007) 
19 Ogren (2007) 
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inconvertibility became a matter of fact in the early 1880s was also adopted as passive 
policy defence based on a high reserve ratio. The higher the reserve ratio the greater the 
credibility the Bank enjoyed20.  
The guarantee of convertibility was legally regulated by the establishment of 
ceilings on the issuance of notes based on two variables - reserves and share capital. The 
relationship between the issue of notes and reserves acted as a guarantee of liquidity 
while the relationship between the issuance of notes and capital was the guarantee of 
solvency. Table 3.1 summarises the limits on issue imposed on the Bank of Spain.  
 
Table 3.1: Legal maximum for banknotes issued by the Bank of Spain, 1874-1913 
 
Minimum capital
Decree 19 March 1874 500 millions pts (1874-1881)
750 millions pts (1882-1890)
(notes  5 paid-up capital)
Law 14 July 1891 reserves 1/3 notes      gold reserves=1/2 reserves 1500 millions pts
(notes  10 paid-up capital)
Decree 9 August 1898 0-1500 mill notes: reserves 1/3 notes      2500 millions pts
1500-2000 mill notes: reserves 1/2 notes      (notes  16 2/3 paid-up capital)
2000-2500 mill notes: reserves  notes      
and for all notes: gold reserves=1/2 reserves
Decree 2 August 1899 0-1500 mill notes: reserves 1/3 notes      2000 millions pts
1500-2000 mill notes: reserves 1/2 notes      (notes  14 2/3 paid-up capital)
and for all notes: gold reserves=1/2 reserves
Law 13 May 1902 0-1200 mill notes: reserves 1/3 notes (1/2 gold) 2000 millions pts
1200-1500 mill notes: reserves  60% notes (notes  14 2/3 paid-up capital)
(40% gold and 20% silver)
1500-2000 mill notes: reserves  70% notes
(50% gold and 20% silver)
Minimum reserves
reserves 1/4 notes
 
Source: Galvarriato (1932, pp. 212-215, 236-237) 
 
The legislation set limits on the issue of notes in the 1874 decree that granted the 
Bank of Spain the monopoly of issue. These limits required that the gold or silver 
reserves were at least one quarter of the banknotes in circulation and that the paid-up 
capital amounted to at least one fifth of the banknotes in circulation. Subsequent laws 
set stricter issue limits in terms of reserves, although no longer related to the paid-up 
capital. In the negotiations with the Treasury, the Bank of Spain strongly defended its 
monopoly of issue, and the Banks´ s directors aimed at separating the legal issue limit 
from the institution’s share capital21. The law of 1891 changed the criteria for issue, and 
required that the reserves amounted to at least one third of the value of notes, with at 
least half of the reserves in gold. The issue limit was set at 1,500 million pesetas, with 
no direct link to the capital which, given the paid-up capital of the Bank at that time, in 
practice amounted to a very substantial reduction in the issue limit equal to 10 times the 
capital. The 1898 decree authorised the Bank of Spain to increase the issue of notes to 
2,500 million pesetas (16 2/3% of its capital), with reserves guaranteed in tranches: a 
reserve ratio of one third was maintained for up to 1,500 million pesetas; a reserve ratio 
of one half was set for the band between 1,500 million and 2,000 pesetas and a reserve 
coefficient of two thirds was set for the band between 2,000 and 2,500 million pesetas; 
half the reserves had to be in gold for all the bands. The decree of 1899 reduced the 
maximum issue to 2,000 million pesetas (14 2/3% of the capital) and maintained the 
                                               
20 Bank of Spain, Annual reports (1894, p. 29 and 1898, p. 26-27) 
21 Serrano Sanz (2004), p. 73 
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reserve limits which had been established in the decree of the previous year. Finally, the 
law of 1902 maintained the issue limit at 2,000 million pesetas and left unchanged the 
reserve ratio for up to 1,200 million pesetas at one third (with half in gold), although it 
increased reserve ratio to 60% for the issue band between 1,200 and 1,500 million 
pesetas (40% in gold and 20% in silver) and 70 percent for the band between 1,500 and 
2,000 million pesetas (50% in gold and 20% in silver). 
The Bank of Spain always had a reserve ratio above the legal limit for silver, but 
it remained at the limit established by law for gold (see figure 3.2). The Bank 
considered the surplus reserve ratio to be an indicator of credibility for conversion. This 
conversion of notes for cash had taken place exclusively in silver since 1883 and, as 
such, maintaining a surplus in the silver reserve ratio was all the Bank had to do to 
ensure its convertibility. The gold reserve ratio remained at the limits specified by law 
and, as a rule, these limits were lower than the 33% used by the gold standard 
countries22. In order to have been able to join the gold standard, the Bank of Spain 
would have had to reduce its note issue substantially, but the Bank of Spain did not feel 
committed to exchange rate stability or the convertibility of banknotes into gold23. 
 
Figure 3.2: Bank of Spain reserve ratio, 1874-1913 (reserves/notes) (%) 
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Sources: reserve ratio calculated from the Bank of Spain balance sheets, Anes (1974b, pp. 143-156 and 
1974c, p. 114). Legal reserve ratio from Galvarriato (1932, pp. 212-215, 236-237) (see Table 3.1). The 
balance sheet of the Bank of Spain did not specify if its reserves were gold or silver until 1881. Spanish 
legislation did not oblige it to keep a percentage of its reserves in gold until 1891. 
 
                                               
22 The Palmer rule established a minimum ratio of reserves of 33%, which was calculated as reserves 
divided by sight liabilities, i.e. notes plus deposits. Spanish legislation established the ratio of reserves 
only with regard to notes, regardless of sight deposits. The gold reserve ratio would therefore be even 
lower if the sight deposits were also considered. 
23 Conant (1915), pp. 315-316; Serrano Sanz (2004), p. 80 
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In part, the excess issue of banknotes was the result of the monetisation of the 
public deficit, which is why Spain could not join the gold standard (see figure 3.3). The 
Bank of Spain was not a government institution and, as such, the Treasury did not share 
in the institution’s profits, but the government granted the Bank the monopoly of issue 
in in 1874 in exchange for a loan of 150 million pesetas. The Bank of Spain advanced 
cash to the Treasury in exchange for government bonds that the Bank kept in its 
portfolio. In the first years of the monopoly of issue the accumulation of public debt did 
not result in increases in the amount of money.24 However the monetisation of the 
deficit became widespread in the mid 1890s and increased sharply with the conflict 
between Spain and the United States in 1898, which led to a precipitous fall in the 
peseta’s exchange rate. The Bank of Spain increased the circulation of notes by an 
average of 10% per year throughout the period in exchange for assuming the Treasury’s 
debt. After the independence of the last Spanish colonies in the early twentieth century, 
the government decided to end fiscal indiscipline and prohibited borrowing from the 
Bank without prior legal authorisation. It also undertook to reimburse the Bank within 
10 years (1902-1911) for the bonds that the Bank retained in its assets25. However, the 
Bank did not reduce the notes in circulation proportional to the reduction of public 
earning assets, which would have provided a gold reserve ratio sufficient to enter the 
gold standard. Instead, the Bank maintained the volume of notes in circulation and 
increased short-term silver reserves because of the lack of turnover to replace the public 
earning assets portfolio with private earning assets26. 
 
Figure 3.3: Bank of Spain portfolio and notes, 1874-1915 (million pesetas) 
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Source: Data from the Bank of Spain balance sheets, Anes (1974b, pp. 143-156) 
 
                                               
24 Martín-Aceña (1985) 
25 Tortella (1970); Anes (1974a); Sabaté Sort and Serrano Sanz (2006) 
26 Conant (1915), p. 318) 
 11
The excess silver reserve ratio, which reached almost 80%, was not compensated 
by high interest rates to maintain profitability. On the contrary, the Bank of Spain’s 
level of interest rates was at the international level, albeit with a different fluctuation 
pattern (see figure 3.4). As noted, the Bank of Spain’s interest rate changed little during 
the era of the classical gold standard. There were two periods of rising rates linked to 
the loss of reserves, in the early 1880s and in the late 1890s. During the remainder of 
the period, interest rates remained stable at levels of between 4% and 4.5%, set at levels 
to minimize the service cost of the public debt27. On the other hand, the policy of the 
Bank of Spain was to offer loans guaranteed with government bonds at an interest rate 
lower than the rate earned by the public bonds themselves, thereby encouraging 
speculators to borrow at much as possible by pledging public bonds, use the loan to buy 
more public bonds and use them once again as a guarantee for another loan to buy more 
public bonds, and so on28.  
 
Figure 3.4: Comparison of annual average discount rates: Spain, England, France, 
Germany, Holland and Belgium, 1880-1913 (average of weekly figures) 
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Source: White (1933), p. 331. The data for the Bank of Spain comes from the Minutes of the 
Shareholders’ General Meetings, 1880-1913. 
 
The Bank maintained the surplus reserves as a measure of credibility, but it was 
aware of the loss of profits that holding a percentage of reserves above the minimum 
required by law entailed29. This loss of potential profits was compensated by larger note 
issue with regard to the paid-up capital (see table 3.1), which enabled the Bank to have 
                                               
27  Martin Aceña (1993), pp.150-151 
28 Conant (1915), p. 314-315 
29 The Bank calculated the losses as the excess reserves multiplied by the discount rate. It justified these 
losses by saying that they were more than offset by its public credibility. By having large silver reserves, 
banknotes holders were assured that convertibility was never jeopardized (Bank of Spain, Annual 
report,1898, pp. 26-27) 
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an average annual shareholder return of over 20% throughout the period of the classical 
gold standard (see figure 3.5). The ROA (Return on Assets) decreased steadily 
throughout the period due to the increase in reserves, but the ROE (Return on Equity) 
remained high and stable thanks to the surplus issue on capital, which enabled the Bank 
to maintain the high shareholder return (see figure 3.6). The risk posed in order to 
sustain a very high ROE was offset by the excess silver reserve ratio. The drawback of 
this policy was to keep the country off the gold standard, because joining the gold 
standard would have meant reducing the note issue, and therefore the shareholder 
return. The Bank of Spain, as a private bank, gave priority to the profitability aim over 
the ‘public good’ of exchange rate stability. We can therefore conclude that the Bank of 
Spain was uninterested in joining the gold standard because it was not a modern central 
bank, but a private bank which had been granted with issuing privilege in exchange for 
monetising the government debt. The Bank of Spain had been granted the monopoly of 
issue but its private constitution was in conflict with the public duties of a genuine 
central bank30. 
 
Figure 3.5: Bank of Spain annual shareholder return (%), 1874-1913 
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Source: Shareholder return = dividend/paid-up capital. Figures from the Minutes of the Shareholders’ 
General Meetings, 1874-1913. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
30 The argument for the contradiction between `privately owned issue banks and their responsibilities as 
central banks in Goodhart (1988) 
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Figure 3.6: Bank of Spain, ROE-ROA (%), 1874-1913 
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Source: ROE (%) = profits/owner’s equity. ROA (%) = profits/total assets. Owner’s equity and assets 
have been taken from the Bank of Spain balance sheets, Anes (1974b, pp. 143-156). Profits from: 
Minutes of the Shareholders’ General Meetings, 1874-1913 (appendix D: 1874-1891, and appendix C: 
1892-1913), Archive Bank of Spain. 
 
4. The Bank of Spain and the Gold Exchange Standard, 1914-1931 
Spain also failed to adopt the Gold Exchange Standard. The peseta continued to 
float freely on the international markets until 1931, although, given the many 
interventions that took place, the situation might be better characterized as of a ‘dirty’ 
float. World War I created a very favourable situation for the economy of a neutral 
country such as Spain, which posted substantial trade surpluses between 1914 and 1918. 
Due to the conviction that only gold could provide adequate safeguards in that uncertain 
environment, currencies obtained were quickly converted into gold, coins and bullion. 
Between 1914 and 1918, the Bank of Spain acquired approximately 463 tons of gold, 
which was worth 1,595 million pesetas at the parity established in the currency reform 
of 1868, which was theoretically still in force. This all led to a significant appreciation 
of the peseta in the international markets (figure 4.1). The increase in gold reserves and 
the increase in the value of the currency revived the discussion on adopting the gold 
standard. Indeed, the preconditions had never before been as favourable, as the two 
factors mentioned above were joined by a rising silver price that made its 
demonetarisation less costly31. However, after the exceptional circumstances of war, the 
Spanish economy once again posted high trade deficits, as well as a persistent 
imbalance in the country’s government accounts. In 1919, the belligerent countries 
gradually abandoned the extraordinary measures taken during the war and their 
respective currencies began to realign themselves according to the new situation32. The 
peseta began to fall in the international markets from 1919 onwards, as did most 
                                               
31 Martinez Mendez (2005) 
32 Eichengreen (1992) 
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European currencies. Thereafter it remained relatively stable between 1922 and 1925. A 
gradual appreciation of the peseta exchange rate in 1926 and 1927 gave new hope to 
advocates of Spain’s membership to the so-called gold exchange standard. However, 
from 1928 onwards, the peseta external value of the peseta began a continuous downfall 
and all official attempts made to stabilize it met with a complete failure. As had 
happened before 1914, the Spanish currency remained outside the dominant monetary 
standard of the period. 
 
Figure 4.1: Nominal exchange rate, 1914-1931 
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Sources: Martínez Méndez (2005, table A26.1) 
 
There were two options available to economies wanting to return to the gold 
standard in the 1920s: to devalue or to deflate. As is well known, the cases of France 
and Britain are the classic examples of both choices33. In Spain, the need to stabilize the 
peseta exchange rate and the possible adoption of the gold standard were hotly debated, 
as is evident in the numerous publications and reports published during the interwar 
years34. However, the attempts of successive governments throughout the period to take 
definite steps in that direction were offset by the obstructive attitude of the Bank of 
Spain, which was strongly opposed to devaluing the peseta below its legal parity of 
1868, which would have led to a strong appreciation of the Bank’s external assets35. The 
appreciation of the reserves would have entailed the appearance of substantial 
extraordinary profits, leading to a political problem over its attribution to the 
government or to the shareholders36. Moreover, the Bank flatly refused to support any 
                                               
33 Eichengreen (1996), pp.51-60. 
34 Examples include Olariaga (1929 and 1987); Sardá (1936), Belda y Pérez de Nueros (1928); Flores de 
Lemus (1929); Ceballos Teresí (1930); Bernacer (1930); Fernández Baños (1930), and Comisión del 
Patrón Oro (1929).  
35 The same thing happened, for example, in France in 1928. See Margaraiz (2003), p.424 
36 The Bank’s high profits in 1921 due to its purchases of gold during the war had already led to heated 
political debate and a great deal of controversy in public opinion that had a very negative impact on the 
institution’s public image (Martínez Méndez, 2005). 
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measure that would involve committing its metallic reserves to ensure (gold) 
convertibility or to the maintenance of a stable exchange rate37.  
Spain’s economic policy at no time aimed at deflation. The Bank of Spain’s 
monetary policy did not follow the classic rules of the game that forced players to react 
to losses of reserves by limiting the system’s liquidity38. The income-generating 
domestic assets therefore evolved independently from the reserves. The changes were in 
the opposite direction in almost 40 percent of cases. On the other hand, the discount rate 
was rarely used to counteract movements of reserves, as evidenced by a correlation 
index of 0.021, but with a positive sign39. In fact, this instrument was barely used, as the 
discount rate changed only nine times between 1914 and 1931. During this period, as in 
the previous one, the issuing bank preferred to use “gold devices” whenever it had to 
deal with situations requiring an increase in the price of money. On several occasions, 
internal instructions were given to ration credit and, on some occasions, silver coins 
were put in circulation instead of issuing banknotes40.  
The passive strategy of maintaining a high reserve ratio continued, in the belief 
that only the existence of a large volume of metal (gold and silver coins and bullion) in 
the vault of the Bank ensured confidence in the paper notes in circulation. Besides, the 
gold newly acquires during the war enabled the issuing institution to increase its reserve 
ratio to the point that the metallic cover exceeded 70 percent in most years, as shown in 
figure 4.2. Hence, a basic difference between this period and the previous one is that 
Spain was easily able to comply with the Palmer rule. In fact, the Bank of Spain’s gold 
coverage remained at around 60 percent throughout the interwar period, well above the 
international level41. 
 
                                               
37 Martin Aceña (1984), p.44 
38 Nurkse (1944) 
39 The same is true of any other relevant interest rate, such as the interest rate for loans secured with 
securities. 
40 Banco de España, Annual reports, 1920-1929 
41 Nurkse (1944), pp.94-98. 
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Figure 4.2: Bank of Spain ratio of reserves, 1914-1931 (reserves/notes or gold/notes) (%) 
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Sources: ratio of reserves (notes/reserves) and gold ratio of reserves (notes/gold) calculated from the 
Bank of Spain balance sheets, Martín-Aceña (1985, table IV-1 and IV-2). Legal ratio of reserves and legal 
ratio of gold reserves from Martínez Méndez (2005, table 15.2.) 
 
Between 1914 and 1920 the issue limit was extended six times reaching 5,000 
million pesetas. However, despite this strong monetary expansion, the Bank of Spain 
had enough gold to back the banknotes in circulation for the first time since gold 
convertibility was interrupted. In fact, the large purchases of gold during the war 
enabled the Bank to maintain an amount of excess reserves far above the legal ratios, as 
shown in figure 4.2. Until 1919 the previously stipulated coverage obligations were 
maintained after each increase in the issuing limit, and coverage of 100% in gold was 
stipulated for the total new issuance42. When the war ended the purchases of gold were 
reduced and hence the rules for reserve ratios were changed.  
 
                                               
42 The sole exception was the increase in August 1914, which did not provide for any minimum in gold or 
a maximum in silver. The issue limit was increased by 500 million pesetas on each occasion.  
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Table 4.1:  Legal maximum for banknotes issued by the Bank of Spain, 1914-1931  
Sources: Data from Martínez Méndez (2005, table 15.2.). There was no legal limit on issue with regard to 
the bank’s social capital in this period, and as such the above figures are an estimate.  
 
Despite the fact that the Bank of Spain had enough reserves to sustain the 
stability of the peseta exchange rate, monetary policy was not conducted in way that 
would have led to the adoption of the gold standard. As shown in figure 4.3, the official 
discount rates were changed only occasionally and for many years the Spanish interest 
rates remained similar to -or even, at times, below- those of the major countries, 
although the balance of payments on the current account was persistently closed with 
deficits. The figure portrays both the official discount rate (for commercial transactions) 
and the rediscount rate (set at one point below the official rate which was applied only 
to financial institutions)43. As was the case in the previous period, the profitability of the 
issuing bank was not maintained as a result of high interest rates. 
The official money rates were changed twice, first in 1920-21 and second in 
1928-31. In both instances the increases came as a response to the depreciation of the 
peseta exchange rate. The initiative was taken by the Treasury which saw the fall of the 
currency as an economic and political failure, and a setback to its desire formally to join 
the gold standard club of nations. The government knew that the rates had to be rise in 
order to defend the peseta and to keep it stable thereafter. However, this policy met with 
the hostility of the Bank´s board of directors reluctant to approve any rise because they 
thought it would reduce its commercial businesses and hence the level of its annual 
profits. Unconcerned with the stability of the exchange rate, and even less so with the 
government’s aim to return to gold convertibility, the Bank tried to block or to minimize 
the increase in the discount rates. The Treasury had the upper hand in 1920 and, despite 
its resistance, the Bank had to give up and agree to a 1 percentage point rise. On the 
contrary, in the changes introduced in 1928-30 the board of the Bank was able to halve 
any of the government’s proposed rates increases44. Nevertheless, it is also true that the 
poor fiscal situation of the Treasury constrained its ability to implement a restricted 
monetary policy. Unable to balance the budget, high interest rates meant an increase in 
the cost of borrowing. Hence, the desire to stabilize the currency and adopt the gold 
standard at the 1868 parity, which required some degree of price deflation by raising the 
cost of money, was in conflict with the always pressing need to finance the budget 
                                               
43 After 1921 the Bank of Spain introduced a rediscount rate applied to all banks registered in the CSB 
44 Martín-Aceña (1984) 
Minimum reserves Min. Gold - Max. Silver Maximum issuing/ Min. Capital
Decree 5.8.1914 up to 2000 according to earlier regulations 2500
 beyond 2000 100% (notes< 16 2/3paid up-capital)
Decree 10.3.1917 up to 2500 according to earlier regulations 3000
beyond 2500 100% 100% gold (notes< 20 paid up-capital)
Decree 6.8.1918 up to 3000 according to earlier regulations 3500
beyond 3000 100% 100% gold (notes< 23 1/3paid up-capital)
Decree 2.1.1919 up to 3500 according to earlier regulations 4000
 beyond 3500 100% 100% gold (notes< 26 2/3paid up-capital)
Decree 27.12.1919 up to 4000 according to earlier regulations 4500
beyond 4000 100% 100% gold (notes< 30 paid up-capital)
Decree 7.10.1920 up to 2000 46.5% 28.5% - 18% 5000
beyond 2000 70% 60%-10% (notes< 33 1/3paid up-capital)
Law 29.12.21 up to 4000 45% 40%-5% 5000
beyond 4000 60% 50%-10% (notes< 28 1/4 paid up-capital)
Decree 6.5.1931 up to 4000 45% 40%-5% 5200
beyond 4000 60% 50%-10% (notes< 29 2/5 paid up-capital)
Decree 27.5.1931 up to 4000 45% 40%-5% 6000
beyond 4000 60% 50%-10% (notes< 33 9/10 paid up-capital)
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deficit. In fact, the adoption of the gold standard would have first required a drastic 
reduction in public expenditures and/or a radical tax reform in order to increase public 
revenues. Some minor fiscal changes were made but they were not sufficiently 
substantial to solve the intractable budget deficits.45 
 
Figure 4.3: Annual average discount rates: Bank of England, Bank of France, 
New York Federal Reserve Bank and Bank of Spain 
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Sources: For Bank of Spain (official and rediscount), Minutes of the Shareholders’ General Meetings, 
1914-1931. For Bank of England and for Reserve Bank of New York, Martínez Mendez (2005, Table 
A30.11). For Bank of France, NBER Macrohistory Database, 
http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/rectdata/13/m13014.dat.  
 
The attempt to stabilize the peseta exchange rate thus was found less in the 
implementation of a firm and orthodox fiscal and monetary policy and more in the 
introduction of administrative devices. In October 1919, forward transactions were 
banned and some foreign financial transactions were subjected to a system of previous 
authorisation46. Administrative intervention was extended in 1924, as the foreign 
exchange operations that could be freely performed became more limited. There then 
followed a short period during which the peseta appreciated and a wave of optimism led 
officials to believe that it was possible to adopt the gold standard at the historical parity. 
However, no monetary and fiscal policies were put in place in order to prepare the 
economy for a formal stabilization. The reversal began in mid-1928, when the peseta 
started to depreciate again. The Ministry of Finance reacted by establishing a new body, 
the Comité Inteventor del Cambio (CIC), to support the external value of the peseta. It 
was also the first step toward a more complete system of exchange control that came 
into place in 1930. 
According to the Banking Act of 1921, which had empowered the government to 
intervene in the exchange market and mandated the Bank of Spain to assist in any 
attempt to defend the peseta rate and to share the expenses in doing so, the CIC was 
                                               
45 Comín (1996), pp. 81-85 
46 Eguidazu (1978), p. 44 
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endowed with funds provided by both the Treasury and the Bank in equal proportion. 
However, instead of committing part of its huge gold reserves (which would have been 
the most reasonable attitude), the board of the Bank invoked legal and statutory 
restrictions and forced the CIC to obtain a foreign loan in London to be used to 
intervene to shore up the peseta. When the CIC consumed the loan and no more funds 
were forthcoming, the value of the peseta plummeted. The intervention was costly and 
the loan was not repaid until the mid 1930s. 
This later episode highlights once again the peculiar character of the Spanish 
issue institution. Despite enjoying a government franchise and the monopoly of issue, 
the directors and the shareholder of the Bank considered the “institution” a purely 
private concern. Therefore the Bank had to be run as any other financial company. 
Gold, as did any other assets in the balance sheet, belonged to the shareholders, not the 
Treasury, and should not be committed to any monetary policy adventure. For the Bank, 
its gold reserves were not a policy instrument that the Treasury could unrestrictedly 
employ. Gold was not there in the vaults of the institution even to assure the 
convertibility of its banknotes, but simply to maintain the confidence of the public in the 
Bank´s liquidity and solvency. The evidence seems to leave no doubt: by the early 
1930s the Bank of Spain was still far from assuming the responsibilities of a central 
bank insofar as monetary policy is concerned. It also highlights that, without the 
cooperation of the bank of issue, it would have been extremely difficult to introduce the 
gold standard and to sustain the stability of the peseta exchange rate. 
The evidence of the interwar years also shows the contradictions between the 
policies followed by the government. Monetary policy, because of the opposition of the 
Bank of Spain, and fiscal policy, because the Treasury´s lack of will to undertake 
radical tax reform, were inconsistent with the declared goal of adopting the gold 
standard at the ideal 1868 parity. Such a goal would have required a substantial degree 
of deflation, at which serious attempts were never made. The alternative to deflation 
would have been to opt for a more realistic parity. However, devaluation was never 
considered. Instead, a sort of escape route was attempted to sustain the value of the 
peseta: the introduction of exchange controls, although this policy was in contradiction 
to the adoption of the gold standard, based on the free movement of capital47. 
The enormous reserves of gold accumulated during the World War I were of no 
use at all in backing the government intention to join the gold standard. The Bank of 
Spain resisted any attempt made by the Treasury to use them to defend the exchange 
rate of the peseta. The Bank of Spain preferred to immobilise its gold in its vaults, and 
to hold reserves in excess of the already high level of reserve requirements set by the 
government. This way of ensuring credibility was very costly in terms of profits. 
However, the Bank’s shareholders were not affected, as a strategy begun in the late 
nineteenth century to dissociate the issue of notes from the Bank’s level of capital was 
continued during this period. 
The behaviour of the two ratios that show the financial returns of the Bank´s 
operations and activities between 1914 and 1931 is shown in figure 4.4. The ROA 
fluctuated substantially during the war years and thereafter remained relatively stable at 
around 1.7%. On the other hand, the ROE increased to over 50% after 1920 and from 
1923 onward its average value was about a remarkable level of 60%. The Bank of Spain 
was, indeed, profitable to its shareholders, who, on average, received a 25% return 
between 1914 and 1931, as can be seen in figure 4.5. This percentage was well above 
that obtained by the owners of the other Spanish financial institutions48. Even in the 
                                               
47 Olariaga (1929) and Sarda (1936) 
48 Martín-Aceña and Pons (1996) 
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1920s, the Bank of Spain did not assume its role as a central bank. The attitude of the 
government to monetary matters was also inconsistent, because its inability to address 
the problem of insufficient public revenues was not compatible with its public concern 
over the exchange rate. In any event, the institutional structure made it impossible to 
overcome the agency problems that the government had with its banker, despite the 
Bank’s gradual loss of independence. The beneficiaries were the Bank’s shareholders. 
 
Figure 4.4: Bank of Spain, ROE-ROA (%), 1914-1931 
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Source: ROE (%) = profits/owner’s equity. ROA (%) = profits/total assets. Owner’s equity from: Bank of 
Spain balance sheets, Minutes of the Shareholders’ General Meetings, 1914-1931, Archive Bank of 
Spain. Total assets in Martínez Méndez (2005, Table 16.3). Profits from: Minutes of the Shareholders’ 
General Meetings, 1914-1931 (appendix C), Archive Bank of Spain. 
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Figure 4.5: Bank of Spain annual shareholder return (%), 1914-1931 
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Source: Shareholder return = dividend/paid-up capital. Bank of Spain balance sheets, Minutes of the 
Shareholders’ General Meetings, 1914-1931, Bank of Spain Archive. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 There is no trace of a formal decision to interrupt the convertibility of the Bank 
of Spain’s banknotes into gold in the minutes of the Board of Directors. However, the 
Bank no longer redeemed its notes in gold after the summer of 1883. The Bank’s gold 
reserves reached a maximum of 125 million pesetas in 1881, and then fell sharply to 50 
million pesetas in 1882. The drop was caused by a combination of factors, including the 
European financial crisis of the early 1880s, which reduced the levels of foreign 
investment, and a deterioration of the balance of payments on the current account. An 
ill-advised operation by the Treasury to reduce and to alter the maturity of the 
outstanding debt also contributed to the loss of gold49. What the minutes of the Board 
for the years 1882 and 1883 reveal is the concern of the directors of the Bank for the 
lack of bullion (both gold and silver) on its balance sheet, as well as the concern that the 
public might refuse to accept the Bank’s notes as they saw that that the institution was 
losing its gold50. 
 No references were made to ending gold convertibility at the meetings of the 
Junta Consultiva de la Moneda, an official consulting body on monetary matters. The 
Junta had recommended the adoption of the gold standard as early as 1876, but no 
government decision had been taken by 1883. When gold convertibility was de facto 
suspended, the members of the Junta maintained absolute silence. In the few meetings 
of the Junta after 1880, the question of the lack of gold and silver coins in circulation 
was discussed, as well as the outflows of (gold) bullion due to the imbalance between 
the metallic ratio at the Madrid Mint and the market metallic ratio, which encouraged 
the exportation of gold. However, the Junta made no policy recommendation and 
                                               
49 Martín-Aceña (1994), pp. 137-39 
50 Bank of Spain, Minutes of the Board for 1882-1883 
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remained silent about the fact that the Bank of Spain was losing its reserves, which led 
it, first, to restrict and then end the convertibility of its notes into gold51. 
Although it is a well-known historical fact that many countries’ currencies which 
were on a gold standard “lato sensu” defined (i.e., without introducing money 
convertibility), the fact of the matter is that they were somehow able to maintain the 
stability of their respective exchange rates. Unlike most European currencies, the 
exchange rate of the inconvertible peseta against gold, and hence against the major 
currencies, fluctuated widely. This is apparent in table 3.1. The nominal exchange rate 
of the peseta varied a great deal, from 25.6 to the pound sterling in 1883 to a peak of 
39.2 in 1898, and then back to 27.1 in 1913. During the 1920s, the Spanish authorities 
made various attempts to stabilise the peseta’s exchange rate and to peg it to gold. 
figure 4.1 shows that they failed and that against the broader international trend, the 
Spanish currency remained off gold. The peseta experienced phases of appreciation, 
followed by phases of depreciation, which became particularly acute after 1928.  
 The minutes of the board of directors of the Bank of Spain suggest that the 
institution refused fully to accept its obligations as a central bank. First, it only acted as 
a lender of last resort under government pressure when successive banking crises 
jeopardised the stability of the financial system52. Second, the Bank’s directors never 
considered the defence of the exchange rate to be one of their duties. Both before and 
after 1914, their main concern was maximising profits and the amount of dividends to 
be paid out to shareholders. Private interests prevailed over the public interest. 
Moreover, when the stabilisation of the peseta was discussed in official circles, the 
Bank strongly argued that the gold parity to be adopted should be that set in 1868, 
regardless of the circumstances and the economic changes that had taken place since 
that date. Any lower parity, which was also unpalatable to the Ministry of Finance, was 
opposed by the Bank despite the fact that it might have eased the adoption of a gold 
standard and stimulated foreign trade. 
 Spain’s monetary experience is exceptional. All European countries were 
members of the gold standard club at one time or another. The gold standard was also 
adopted in America and in many Asian nations. The Bank of Spain was always willing 
to guarantee the silver convertibility of its paper notes. However, the stability of the 
exchange rate of the peseta was not among its concerns. All Spanish governments 
wanted the introduction of the gold standard, and deplored the instability of the peseta. 
Time and again, plans were made to join the international monetary system. However, 
the Treasury’s fiscal policy was systematically inconsistent with such a goal. As stated 
by the renowned Comisión del Patrón Oro in its famous 1929 report, monetary stability 
was sacrificed at the altar of the public budget deficit. Spain’s historic detachment from 
the world monetary system cost the country dearly in terms of both its debt burden and 
GDP growth, two questions that warrant further research. 
 
 
                                               
51 Junta Consultiva de la Moneda, Minutes for 1882-1883 and Serrano Sanz (2004) 
52 Martín-Aceña (2000b) 
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